Target firms are often faced with bidders that are not equally well informed. This reduces the competition between the bidders, since a less well informed bidder fears the winner's curse more. We analyze how a target should optimally be sold in the presence of asymmetric bidders. We show that a sequential procedure can extract the highest possible transaction price. The target first offers an exclusive deal to a better informed bidder, without considering a less well informed bidder.
Introduction
The seller's problem in a takeover is typically the lack of an established market price for the target. The seller has to find a way to discover what the target is worth and in the process sell it at the highest possible price. This value depends on the value estimates of various potential buyers. Negotiations with potential buyers are one way to discover their valuations and to sell the target; auctions are an alternative method.
An important factor is that not all bidders are equally well informed. Management bids are the clearest example: in many cases the target's management team (or a subset of senior managers) declares an interest in purchasing the target, and their privately known value estimate must be more reliable than any other potential buyer's. Similarly, a competitor should find it much easier to evaluate a firm's prospects than a bidder with no experience in the target's line of business. Either way, a less well informed bidder must be particularly worried about the winner's curse, i.e. overpaying after beating a much better informed rival in a takeover contest, because of a grossly over-optimistic value estimate.
In this paper we ask how a target should optimally be sold if bidders are not equally well informed about its value. We analyze this question in a simple auction setup, and we describe the optimal selling procedure. Unlike the existing literature (discussed below), our model allows for both private value and common value bidding environments. For example, trade buyers may be interested in a target because of possible synergies that are not available to other bidders; this situation can be modeled as a private values environment.
Alternatively, all bidders may be able to exploit the same sources of gains (e.g. cost-cutting, financial restructuring, etc.), but their value is unknown; this situation with financial buyers can be modeled as a common values environment. Our model captures both types of environment, and mixtures thereof: the target's value may include both common and private value components.
We find that a sequential procedure is optimal, i.e. it can extract the highest expected transaction price. The sequential procedure has very simple and realistic properties. Initially, the target communicates exclusively with the better informed bidder. If she is willing to pay a sufficiently high price, a sale is concluded right away, without soliciting any additional bids.
If the offered price is not sufficiently high, the target inquires whether the better informed bidder is willing to bid at least a certain amount in a bidding contest that may follow. If not, then the target is offered to the less well informed bidder at a price that she will not reject. If the better informed bidder is willing to bid at least the minimum amount, then the target invites bids from any party and holds a modified first-price auction, in which the winner pays the price she bid.
This sequential procedure can extract the highest expected transaction price from the bidders by treating better and less well informed bidders differently. This allows it to play off the bidders better than standard auctions (for example open auctions), which treat bidders symmetrically. High bids from the better informed bidder are encouraged by promising exclusivity; low bids are discouraged by threatening to offer exclusivity to the less well informed bidder. The procedure thus distorts the allocation, since compared with a standard auction, the better informed bidder is more likely to win with a high valuation and less likely to win with a low valuation. The cost of doing so is that if the sale must be concluded with the less well informed bidder, the transaction price may be lower; however, the value that can be extracted from the better informed bidder more than compensates for this loss.
The sequential procedure has realistic features. In practice, we do observe exclusive negotiations with one bidder. In these negotiations, the target may threaten to exclude this bidder from any further negotiations or bidding, if her offers seem low. These negotiations may end with a deal, and third-party offers are not solicited or considered. Often, these negotiations end with a 'stalking horse' bid which other potential buyers must outbid; this is comparable with the minimum bid that the better informed bidder must be willing to make if she wants to participate in the modified first-price auction. Alternatively, the negotiations may be given up and the target is sold through an initial public offering or (in the case of a division or subsidiary) spun off to the seller's shareholders.
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Our model also highlights some strategic stumbling blocks that targets and winning bid-ders may encounter. The sequential procedure may end up selling the target at a price that is below the valuation of a rejected bidder. This rejected bidder could approach the target's shareholders and offer a higher price, arguing that the target's board was not maximizing shareholder value if it rejected its more attractive offer. If a bidder anticipates that this can happen, then the sequential structure of the procedure becomes meaningless: the rules that finally apply are not those of the sequential procedure, but those of a standard highprice auction. Consequently, the bidders simply wait for a bidding war to break out after the procedure has officially ended, and they never consider any of the earlier bids as truly final bids. This destroys the incentives that the sequential procedure generates, and the realized transaction price should be expected to be smaller than it could be with an optimal procedure.
The legal framework within which takeover targets and bidders operate does not solve this problem. Quite to the contrary, it amplifies it. Legally, the target's board is obliged to consider any offers that are submitted, whether solicited or unsolicited. This obligation benefits a target's shareholders ex post, after an agreement has been reached, but if such an outcome is anticipated, the target's shareholders are worse off ex ante. In practice, targets and bidders agree to use a variety of deal protection devices like lock-ups, termination fees, no-shopping clauses, or to the selective lifting of poison pills.
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These deal protection devices make the target less attractive to other potential bidders, making it less likely that they present higher offers for the target. Not surprisingly, the use of these deal protection devices has been challenged repeatedly in court by target shareholders, who claim that they constitute breaches of fiduciary duty by the board of directors. These court decisions give mixed recommendations. In a recent split decision, 3 the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that an "absolute lock-up" was a breach of fiduciary duty. Some earlier decisions upheld the use of lock-ups and similar devices.
2 In stock lock-ups, the favored bidder is given the option to purchase a certain number of shares, either from certain (typically large) shareholders, or out of treasury stock. This makes it harder for other bidders to take over a target, or more expensive. Termination fees are payable to the favored bidder if a takeover is not consummated. With no-shopping clauses, target boards commit not to actively encourage additional bids.
3 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. et al. and Miles et al. v. Outcalt et al. (2003 Del. LEXIS 195) .
Our analysis shows that a target's board should not be required to always consider unsolicited bids, if it designed a selling procedure that explicitly exploits the possibility of rejecting bidders to increase the expected transaction price. Similarly, a target board should not be required to treat all possible bidders symmetrically. Instead, the board should be given the right to design a procedure to sell the target, and to commit to the rules it devised.
Undoubtedly, there is a need to guarantee that the target's board acts in the shareholders' interest when designing the selling procedure. However, this is a fundamental problem that affects all decisions that a board makes, so the solution should be a general solution, and not a legally imposed constraint on the board's possibilities to maximize shareholder value in takeover situations.
For that reason, we abstract from agency problems between shareholders and management in this paper. We are interested in the target's possibilities to extract the highest possible transaction price in a takeover, and abstracting from managerial agency problems allows us to develop implications that are dependent on the degree of bidder asymmetry, and on the level of private synergies bidders bring to the table, and not dependent on the existence of a cozy relationship (or lack thereof) between the target management and the successful bidder. We do not mean to imply that agency problems are not relevant, however.
In Section 6 we discuss alternative explanations to those that our model provides, and we suggest how explanations based on agency considerations can be distinguished from ours.
We are not the first to study takeovers as bidding contests. Fishman (1988) rationalized high initial-bid premia by modeling takeovers as a potential contest between two bidders. Daniel and Hirshleifer (1992) , Bhattacharyya (1992) , Burkart (1995) , Singh (1998 ), Bulow et al. (1999 and Ravid and Spiegel (1999) also model takeover contest in an applied auction setting. However, all these papers take the target firm as largely passive. In our paper, the target firm is active: it designs the selling procedure, and it thereby affects the behavior of the bidders.
Our paper is most closely related to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) , who provide rationales for the frequent use of greenmail or value-reduction strategies by takeover targets. Their models are complementary to ours, since they analyze a takeover market in which firms wait for raiders to identify them as takeover targets, while we focus on a situation in which it is publicly known that a firm is up for sale, for example if a firm announces that it is selling a non-core division. Also, our approach is more general, since we do not restrict the target's possibilities to design a procedure that can extract the highest possible price. We discuss these and other differences in more detail in Section 6.
Our paper is also related to the literature in optimal auction design. Myerson (1981) was perhaps the first to use mechanism design to analyze optimal auctions. In an example, Myerson (1981) Maskin and Riley (2000) show why different standard auctions cannot be optimal in the presence of bidder asymmetry, but they do not analyze the optimal selling procedure itself, and how it depends on the bidding environment (how asymmetric the bidders are, how the optimal selling procedure and the outcome change in a common value setup, etc.). Cantillon (2000) extends their analysis, by showing that an increase in bidder asymmetry hurts the seller if she uses standard auctions, since it decreases expected revenue. This underlines the relevance of designing an optimal selling procedure, in particular if bidders are not equally well informed.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the auction model. In Section 3 we describe some key properties of the optimal selling procedure. We present the sequential procedure (which is optimal) in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss some implications, both theoretical and empirical, and in Section 6 we discuss possible alternative explanations. Section 7 concludes. Some of the proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
A target firm is for sale, and two bidders, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, are interested in buying it. These bidders are imperfectly informed about the target's value. We assume that the full information value of the target firm to the bidders comprises of two independent components, t 1 and t 2 , and that each bidder has some information about one of these components.
Bidder i values the firm at αt i + (1 − α)t j , a weighted average of two independent components t i and t j , with α ∈ 
. For tractability reasons, we assume that the hazard rate H is increasing in t i . Also for tractability, we assume that the target's shareholders value the target at zero, and that t is sufficiently high: tH(t) ≥ 1. Thus, with probability ϕ i the signal s i is informative, and with probability 1 − ϕ i it is pure noise. If the bidders could observe both signals they would use Bayes' law to update their priors, and the conditional expected value would be given by,
1 2 in our model). All other analyses of takeover contests are restricted to pure private value models (the case α = 1 in our model); see e.g. Fishman (1988) , Bhattacharyya (1992) , Daniel and Hirshleifer (1992) , Burkart (1995) , Singh (1998) , and Ravid and Spiegel (1999) . The alternative model with "affiliated signals" is used in e.g. Back and Zender (1993) .
5 These assumptions simplify the exposition: they are sufficient to ensure that imposing a reserve price for both bidders is sub-optimal.
(where E[t] is the unconditional expected value of t i and of the signals s i ). Notice that variations in ϕ 1 or ϕ 2 do not affect bidder i's unconditional expected value of the target,
We assume (without loss of generality) that bidder 1 is at least weakly better informed, i.e. ϕ 1 ≥ ϕ 2 . This asymmetry assumption captures a variety of situations in which different bidders have different expertise in evaluating a target. For example, bidders may specialize on different sides of a firm, e.g. its operations, its optimal capital structure, its growth potential, its cash-generation potential, etc., and their ideas about how to value other dimensions may be very vague. Alternatively, some bidders may have superior information because of their special relationship with the target. Such bidders may be competitors, suppliers or customers, who know more than third parties about the target's strengths and weaknesses.
Similarly, a management team offering a buy-out can be expected to have superior information.
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The effect of asymmetry between bidders on the target firm's ability to extract value is the focus of this paper.
By varying the parameter α, our model captures a second dimension in which bidding environments may differ. A target may attract trade buyers, e.g. competitors, suppliers, customers, etc., who may hope to realize individual synergies if they take over the target.
If each bidder can realize synergies that are not available to others, a model with private values is appropriate. We can capture this situation by assuming that α is large. In other situations, bidders may be better described as financial buyers. For example, private equity funds may be attracted to a takeover contest if there are possibilities to add value that are not specific to certain bidders, for example firing current management, selling off non-core assets, cutting costs, changing financial leverage, etc. Nevertheless, some bidders may have superior information about the potential for cost-cutting, etc. These situations are better modeled as common value environments, i.e. α should be small.
In order to focus on how informational asymmetry affects bidding and the optimal selling 6 The differences in the quality of information need not be caused by data availability problems: targets typically set up "data rooms", which bidders can access after signing a confidentiality agreement. Instead, different bidders may have unequal experience with the firm or the industry in which it operates, so they are not equally able to interpret the data and form equally reliable value estimates.
scheme, we abstract from issues that have been analyzed elsewhere. We assume that bids are cash bids and financed internally, the target firm is an all-equity firm, and we assume that bidders do not own any shares in the target firm.
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Furthermore, the seller (the target's shareholders) and the bidders maximize their expected profits. Finally, all players are riskneutral, and all reservation payoffs are zero.
Properties of an Optimal Mechanism
We employ the methodology outlined in Bulow and Roberts (1989) and Bulow and Klemperer (1996) to derive the optimal mechanism. They use the revelation principle and show that the optimal mechanism must ensure incentive compatibility and allocate the object to the bidder with the highest "marginal revenue." The methodology has the advantage that it separates the allocation decision from the choice of transfer payments when analyzing the optimal mechanism: optimality follows if the allocation rule satisfies certain conditions; and incentive compatibility then determines the transfers that the bidders make.
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Using the methodology of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) requires that we define a bidder's "price", "quantity" and "revenue". Given signal realizations s 1 and s 2 , bidder i's "price" is her valuation v i (s 1 , s 2 ); and given the rival bidder's signal s j , bidder i's "quantity" q i (s i ) is the probability that her valuation is not smaller than v i (s 1 , s 2 ). Multiplying price and quantity yields bidder i's "revenue",
7 See Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2000) and (2002) for a discussion of how non-cash bids or debtfinanced bids affect bidding. Israel (1991) examines the bids for a target firm, in situations in which some of the increase in value of the target firm is captured by debt. For an analysis of toeholds see Burkart (1995) , Singh (1998) and Bulow et al. (1999) .
8 An alternative method to derive the optimal mechanism is to follow the approach used in Myerson (1981) . This leads to exactly the same results; details are available in an earlier version of this paper.
For expositional ease, define
Substituting v i (s 1 , s 2 ) in (2) using (1), and then rearranging using (3), we obtain that bidder 1's marginal revenue is higher than bidder 2's if and only if
Since Ψ is monotonically increasing in s i , it has an inverse, which we denote by Ψ −1
. We can then define a threshold signal z 1 (s 2 ) for bidder 1, such that bidder 1's marginal revenue is higher if and only if s 1 ≥ z 1 (s 2 ), where
It is easily verified that z 1 (s 2 ) ∈ (t, t] for all s 2 , so z 1 is well-defined.
We denote an allocation rule by p i (s 1 , s 2 ). It specifies the probability that bidder i wins the target, given signals s 1 and s 2 .
Lemma 1 The optimal allocation rule is
The expected payoff for the seller is
Proof. Our assumption tH(t) ≥ 1 ensures that the bidders' marginal revenue is never negative. The rest of the proof follows directly from Bulow and Klemperer (1996) and is therefore omitted.
To study the properties of the optimal allocation rule it will be convenient to work with bidder 1's cut-off signal, z 1 (s 2 ), as defined in (4). It is optimal to sell the target firm to bidder 1 if and only if her signal is at least weakly higher than z 1 (s 2 ). Analyzing the properties of z 1 , thus, allows us to predict under what circumstances the target firm will be sold to a better informed bidder.
Lemma 2 The function z 1 is monotonically increasing. In s 2 = t it attains a value z 1 (t) > t.
then z 1 (t) < t, and there exists exactly one signal s 2 = σ such that z 1 (σ) = σ; for Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 implies that bidder 1's probability of winning is non-decreasing in s 1 and nonincreasing in s 2 , which are plausible properties of an optimal mechanism. Figure if s 1 ≥ z 1 (s 2 ), bidder 1 wins; if s 1 < z 1 (s 2 ), bidder 2 wins. If bidder 1's signal is low enough, s 1 < z 1 (t), she certainly does not win the target. If bidder 1's signal is high enough, if s 1 ∈ z 1 (t), z 1 (t) , either bidder may win, and a higher signal increases the likelihood of winning. 
A Sequential Procedure That Is Optimal
We now describe a sequential selling procedure that has realistic features and is optimal (it uses the optimal allocation rule and maximizes the expected transaction price). The target first communicates exclusively with one bidder at a time, possibly closing a deal with one of those bidders right away. The key feature of this first stage is that there is no active bidding contest among the bidders. If the first stage does not end with an exclusive deal, the second stage starts, and the target invites competitive bids from both bidders; their bids then determine the identity of the winner, and the winner's bid is the price that she must pay. 
Bidder 2's strategy: Accept offer to pay b 2 in Stage I; and in Stage II bid
These are equilibrium strategies if the targets sets Proof. See the Appendix.
The bidding functions b 1 and b 2 are reminiscent of the equilibrium bidding functions in a standard first-price auction. The first term is the expected value conditional on the bidder winning the auction (after having reached Stage II in the sequential procedure); the second term is the level of shading that maximizes the bidder's expected payoff. If we set ϕ 2 = ϕ 1 , then the optimal selling procedure sets z 1 (s 2 ) = s 2 , i.e. we have an unbiased allocation rule, and the bidding functions b 1 and b 2 are the standard first-price equilibrium bidding functions.
Proposition 1
The sequential selling procedure raises the highest possible expected transaction price and is therefore optimal.
Proof. As in Bulow and Klemperer (1996) , a selling procedure is optimal if it uses the optimal allocation rule (described in Lemma 1) and a bidder with the lowest possible signal realization earns her reservation payoff (which we assumed is zero). Both requirements are satisfied by construction: the allocation rules are the same, and the probability of winning and the payment for a bidder with a signal realization of t are zero.
The key feature of the selling procedure is that it accentuates the incentive for the bidders to reveal a high willingness to pay. The optimal procedure is a stick-and-carrot mechanism -it promises exclusivity to bidder 1 if she reveals a high willingness to pay (the "carrot" side of the mechanism), while bidder 1 has no chance of winning if she is unwilling to bid above a lower threshold (this is the "stick" side). Because bidder 1's signal is more informative than bidder 2's, the sequential procedure puts more emphasis on extracting high payments from bidder 1; bidder 2's willingness to pay is only solicited if bidder 1's turned out to be in the intermediate range.
When designing the selling procedure, the seller must trade off two goals. One goal is to extract as much of the value that bidders realize if they win the target. Biasing the procedure helps, since a threat to sell to the rival bidder makes a bidder willing to pay more. This bias conflicts with a second goal, however: less value is created, since a biased allocation rule makes it more likely that the winning bidder is not the bidder with the highest valuation. It may then pay to reduce the degree of bias in the allocation rule. The disadvantage is that doing that allows the bidders to keep a larger fraction of the value that is being created.
However, the increase in the overall value created (with a less biased allocation rule) may offset the seller's loss from a lower-powered incentive scheme, since she may benefit from obtaining a somewhat smaller fraction of a larger overall value. , the value that is created does not depend on the identity of the winner, since both find the target equally valuable; the seller must then only worry about extracting as much value as possible.
Implications
In this section we discuss the factors that are key in the design of the optimal selling procedure. We also discuss some empirical implications, and we suggest how some of the key factors may be identified or measured in practice.
The Use of Deal Protection Devices
We have assumed that the target commits not to change the rules of the sequential procedure, once it has started. Without such a commitment, the procedure will not be incentive compatible. It is easy to show that both bidders may have an incentive to bypass the sequential procedure if they do not win the target, by offering to pay more than the winner. Proof. See the Appendix.
It is easy to see how this may happen: in a Stage I exclusive deal, the price does not depend on the exact realization of the signals, whether bidder 1 wins or bidder 2. For example, the price b 1 is chosen such that with the threshold signal s 1 = z 1 (t), bidder 1 is willing to buy the target (she is willing to buy the target at that price with any signal
. If the procedure ends in Stage I with a sale to bidder 1, then bidder 2 can infer that s 1 was high; if her own signal is high enough, her updated estimate of the target's value can be above b 1 , and it would pay for her to convince the target to ignore the outcome of the sequential procedure and accept a payment which is higher than b 1 . Similarly, suppose the procedure ends in Stage I with a sale to bidder 2, who is supposed to pay b 2 . This price is low enough such that bidder 2 is willing to pay it even with the lowest signal, t. If bidder 1's signal is close to the threshold z 1 (t), then her valuation may be high enough such that she is willing to offer more than b 2 for the target after bidder 2 was declared the winner.
If the bidders anticipate that the loser will offer a higher price, and that the seller will accept such an offer, then the incentive structure of the sequential procedure is undermined: the bidders will submit low bids and wait for a bidding war to erupt once the sequential procedure has ended and a winner has officially been declared. If the loser tops the winner's price by a small amount (and therewith destroys the deal that the target closed with the winner), then the official winner may have an incentive to top this late bid, and so on: in effect, the procedure takes on features of a standard English auction, in which the bids are raised until one of the bidders drops out. This type of auction treats the bidders symmetrically, and the target loses the benefits of the optimal bias described in Lemma 1.
Thus, if the selling procedure is to extract the highest possible expected price, the target needs to offer the bidders some form of assurance that the losing bidder will not step in and try to bypass the sequential procedure. Late bids are particularly threatening if the sequential procedure ends in Stage I, where one bidder enjoys exclusivity and the other bidder is excluded from bidding: in these cases, target shareholders may side with the rejected bidder and try to force the board to accept the unsolicited higher offer, since to an outsider or a court there seems to have been no real competition for the target.
In some cases, mere animosity towards unsolicited bids may keep unwanted bidders from speaking up (for example, the unsolicited bid may be termed "hostile", or the target may initiate antitrust proceedings). In other cases, boards will have to resort to legal devices that help them cement the deal with the winning bidder. There are numerous deal protection devices that target boards use in practice. Most of these prevent unsolicited bids by increasing an unwanted bidder's cost of acquiring the target. One example are termination fees, payable to a bidder if she was promised a sale but the deal is not concluded. Another example are lock-up clauses, which give a certain bidder the right to buy shares or assets at a low price, a right that will be exercised if a third party takes over the target. No-shopping clauses can make it harder for third parties to prepare a bid, since the target's board may restrict access to relevant information (however, they cannot prevent the target from considering unsolicited bids). Finally, a target may have poison pills in place that it promises to lift after concluding a sale to the preferred bidder, but not otherwise.
These deal protection devices can help target boards cement their commitment to the rules of the selling procedure that they designed. However, their use is often challenged in court: shareholders often sue their own firm if it granted deal protection devices to a specific bidder, arguing that doing so discourages more attractive bids from other possible bidders.
The courts have upheld the use of these devices in some cases, and ruled them unacceptable in other cases. Our results show how important it is to distinguish the ex-ante and ex-post benefits and costs of deal protection devices. Clearly, after a deal has been concluded, it is in the interest of target shareholders if the target's board behaves opportunistically and accepts a late bid from a losing bidder. However, this undermines the ability of the board to extract a higher price in the first place, since it restricts the board to selling the target using a standard auction, which treats all bidders symmetrically and is not optimal. It is thus in the interest of the shareholders of all potential takeover targets to allow the use of deal protection devices, and courts should therefore dismiss shareholder lawsuits if a target's board can show that its asymmetric treatment of potential bidders happened in response to informational asymmetries between the bidders.
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Deal protection devices are widely used in practice.
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This makes it possible to empirically measure how biased takeover negotiations or contests are in practice: the more biased the selling procedure, the larger the threat of opportunistic late bids, and the more a board must rely on deal protection devices to credibly cement a deal. The observable use of deal protection devices then may be a good proxy for the degree of bias in a selling procedure.
Bidders' Chances of Winning
The presence of bidder asymmetry makes it optimal to use a sequential procedure, which biases the allocation to extract a higher expected transaction price. An important question is how the extent of bidder asymmetry affects the selling procedure. If ϕ 1 increases or ϕ 2 decreases, the bidders become more asymmetric. The weak bidder becomes relatively less well informed and should therefore fear the winner's curse more. She creates less competition for the strong bidder, which may reduce competition overall, and the selling procedure must be adapted to ensure that the expected transaction price does not fall by too much. Intuitively, one would expect that a weakening of the weak bidder is compensated by strengthening the weak bidder's position and weakening the strong bidder's position. We show that this is only partly correct.
Proposition 3 An increase in ϕ 1 or a decrease in ϕ 2 , i.e. an increase in bidder asymmetry, has the following effects:
, it increases the likelihood of a Stage I sale to bidder 1.
9 Some practitioners seem to share this opinion: "Deal makers say the inability to lock up key shareholders could actually result in lower prices being paid because prospective buyers won't put their best offer on the table if they can't be certain the transaction will be completed." (Cited from Merger Business Faces New Order With Court Ruling on 'lock-ups', Wall Street Journal, Apr 7, 2003, p. C4.) See also the dissenting opinion in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. et al. and Miles et al. v. Outcalt et al. (2003 Del. LEXIS 195) . 10 Coates and Subramanian (2000) find that 37.3% of the firms in their samples sign termination fees, and 12.7% grant lock-up options. Bates and Lemmon (2003) find that 37% of the firms in their sample agree to target termination fees, and 17% grant lock-up options. They find that the use of termination fees has increased from 2% in 1989 to 60% in 1998. Officer (2003) finds that more than 40% of the firms in his sample include target termination fees.
It increases the likelihood of a Stage I sale to bidder 2.

It decreases the likelihood of a Stage II sale, i.e. a bidding contest.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, if the weak bidder gets weaker, the optimal response is not to make it generally easier for her to win. Instead, the seller's optimal response is to accentuate the stickand-carrot policy. More precisely, it should become easier for the strong bidder to enjoy exclusivity with a high signal realization, but at the same time it should become more likely that the strong bidder is excluded if her signal is low (and the target is sold to bidder 2 in an exclusive deal). Notice that if α = 1 2 , this does not apply, since the probability of a Stage I sale to bidder 1 should be zero (cf. Lemma 2).
The optimal procedure thus strengthens the weak bidder's position if the strong bidder's signal is low, but it strengthens the strong bidder's position if her signal is high. The intuition for this is that as bidder 1's signal becomes relatively more informative, distortions of the allocation become more effective, but at the same time such distortions become more costly for high signals s 1 . Consequently, the optimal selling procedure makes it easier for bidder 1 to win with a high signal, and it is optimal to make it harder for her to win with a low signal. Unavoidably, the likelihood of enjoying exclusivity increases for both bidders.
An immediate empirical implication is that if a takeover target faces more asymmetric bidders, we should observe that the bidders are treated more asymmetrically. As we argued above (in Section 5.1), we should therefore find a higher incidence of deal protection devices if bidders are more asymmetric. For empirical work, this requires that we identify the extent of bidder asymmetry, and possibly the identity of the weak and strong bidders.
Identifying a strong bidder may be easy in some cases. The best example are management buy-outs: if a target's management team competes with outside bidders, we should expect the management team to have superior information. The same holds for investors with large financial stakes in the target. Alternatively, a firm's direct competitors should have better information available than bidders who do not operate in the target's industry.
Measuring the severity of information problems is less straightforward, but an indirect measure may be useful. There is more scope for bidder asymmetry to be a serious concern if investors find it hard to value a target, for example because it is R&D-intensive and its R&D performance is kept secret; its operations are complex; it operates in a new industry or an industry without established competitors; its value represents mainly growth opportunities and other intangibles; or because the profitability of its individual operations is not transparent, for example because the firm is a diversified conglomerate. Such firms are more opaque than others, but they may be less opaque to their managers, competitors, and other related parties, than to outside investors. Thus, they provide more scope for asymmetrically informed bidders. On the other hand, if most of the information that is needed to value a target is readily available, there is little scope for bidder asymmetry to be a major concern (e.g., a focused one-division firm operating in a mature industry).
Thus, measures of firm opaqueness could be used as proxies for the severity of bidder asymmetries, not because opaque firms are necessarily going to face asymmetric bidders, but instead because with opaque firms there is more scope for bidder asymmetry to have a measurable effect on the selling procedure or its outcome. Hence, one is more likely to econometrically find evidence of bidder asymmetry for more opaque firms.
The existing empirical literature provides some support for our prediction that more opaque targets are sold using more asymmetric selling procedures, making heavier use of deal protection devices. Coff (2003) finds that the incidence of lock-up options is higher for R&D intensive firms. Similarly, Bates and Lemmon (2003) find that termination fees are more common in technology and pharmaceutical industries. These are also industries that are newer and more complex, have less tangible assets and have larger growth opportunities. Officer (2003) reports similar findings, and additionally that conglomerates have the highest incidence of termination fees. Using a target's market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the presence of growth opportunities, Bates and Lemmon (2003) confirm that larger growth opportunities make termination fees more likely.
As we argued above, MBOs are probably the best example for a situation in which one bidder has superior information. Our model predicts that if an MBO team competes with less well informed outside bidders, the likelihood of an exclusive deal should be higher, and the use of deal protection devices should be heavier. Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies that report any related findings. It would be useful to take this prediction to the data, since it contradicts the prediction of a model based on managerial entrenchment: a strong and independent board should agree to deal protection devices with any type of bidder, but only in the presence of bidder asymmetry; in contrast, a weak board that is controlled by the manager should grant deal protection only to the MBO team (see Section 6 below).
A second key variable for the optimal procedure is α, which measures the relative size of private value and common value components in the bidders' valuations. Our model is general enough to capture both private value and common value environments, as well as setups with elements of both. As we argued above, an environment with a large private value (high α) component may describe bidders that are trade buyers, i.e. they are interested in the target because they hope to exploit various synergies that may not be available to other bidders.
11
In contrast, an environment with a large common value component (low α) describes bidders that are financial buyers, i.e. bidders interested in the target mainly to realize profits and efficiency gains that would be available to any buyer. (Private equity funds specialized in buyouts are an example for such bidders.) As we discussed above, a private value component complicates the analysis of the optimal selling procedure: the seller wants to extract as much value as possible from the bidders, which can be achieved by biasing the allocation rule, but this reduces the overall value that is created, since it is more likely that the winner is not the bidder with the highest valuation.
Reducing the overall value that is created may hurt the seller, since there is less value that the selling procedure can extract. Thus, there is a tradeoff between using a high-powered incentive scheme that extracts value and using a low-powered scheme that creates more 11 Competitors, suppliers or customers of the target may hope to realize cost savings through more complete product lines, streamlined supply chains and better communication; and companies operating in similar but not directly related business lines may hope to add value through cross-selling, for example insurance firms and banks.
value.
Proposition 4 An increase in α increases the likelihood of a Stage I sale to bidder 1.
The intuition behind this result is that the seller's focus is on extracting a high price from the strong bidder, since she is relatively better informed, while using a possible exclusive deal with the weak bidder as a threat to extract that high payment. As α increases, both bidders become better informed, but the effect on bidder 1 is stronger. It therefore becomes costlier to bias the selling procedure against the strong bidder, since more value is destroyed by letting bidder 2 win even if bidder 1's signal is high. Consequently, the cut-off z 1 (t) decreases. there is no need for a "carrot", i.e. no threshold z 1 (t) such that if s 1 ≥ z 1 (t), then bidder 1 wins with certainty.
Of course, this discussion only applies if bidders are asymmetric -if bidders are symmetric, then the optimal selling procedure is always a standard auction. For example, it applies to contested MBO bids, in which a management team competes with a competitor of the target, and both have a significant private value component: the competitor may expect to realize synergies due to overlapping products and distribution channels, while the management team may enjoy control rents or fear losing their jobs. The more important these private value components, the more likely it should become that a takeover deal is concluded with the management team in Stage I.
Notice that this prediction is similar to a prediction that models based on managerial entrenchment would generate: in both cases, management buyout teams are more likely to enjoy deal protection devices, either because the management team controls the board of its company, or because the bidders in the takeover contest had large private value components.
(We will come back to managerial entrenchment problems below, in Section 6.)
Bid Premia and Target Shareholder Gains
A key question in the empirical literature on takeovers is how much target shareholders benefit. Researchers measure either announcement effects, arguing that in efficient capital markets, investors should immediately anticipate what benefits shareholders will eventually realize; or researchers measure bid premia, i.e. how much higher an initial or final bid was, compared with the last closing price before bidding started. Intuitively, the extent of bidder asymmetry should affect the expected transaction price. Cantillon (2000) analyzes a model with private values and asymmetric bidders and finds that a weakening of the weak bidder hurts the seller, if she is constrained to using a standard auction. We now analyze whether the same applies if the target is free to design the selling procedure.
Unfortunately, the analysis is not tractable for the general model that we used so far, but an assumption on the distribution of the signals is sufficient to make such an analysis possible. Specifically, we assume that f is uniform with support [1, 2] (we choose a lower bound of 1 to satisfy the assumption that tH(t) ≥ 1). This simplifies the analysis, since we can derive closed form solutions for all variables of interest. Proof. See the Appendix.
The first result is remarkable: the competitive position of the weaker bidder is weakened by the decrease in ϕ 2 , and yet the optimal selling procedure's ability to play the bidders off against each other is improved, since it can extract a higher expected transaction price. A weakening of the weak bidder reduces the degree of competition between the bidders, which should harm the target's shareholders. However, the target can adapt the optimal selling procedure in response to a reduction in ϕ 2 . Proposition 3 shows that if bidders are more asymmetrically informed, the target's optimal response is to design a more biased selling procedure. A weaker bidder is a more effective tool when it comes to extracting a higher payment from the strong bidder. Additionally, a decrease in ϕ 2 reduces the informational advantage the weak bidder has over the target firm, and therefore the rents that she can expect to earn. Combined, these two effects increase the target's expected transaction price (and the prices and bids in different stages of the sequential procedure).
However, the expected transaction price is increased by biasing the allocation more, which means that the winner is less likely to be the bidder with the higher valuation (recall that marginal revenue determines the winner). This explains the last result in Proposition 5, that total value creation is reduced if ϕ 2 decreases. We will come back to this result below, in Section 5.4.
Empirical studies have shown that the use of deal protection devices that favor one bidder does not necessarily harm target shareholders (see e.g. Jennings and Mazeo (1993), Comment and Schwert (1995) , Bates and Lemmon (2003) , Officer (2003 ), or Peck (2002 ). Even in the case of MBO offers, where bidder asymmetry should be most pronounced, Kaplan (1989) finds significant premia and argues that management cannot use informational advantages to purchase the target at a lower price (see also Lee (1992) ). This is consistent with target boards optimally biasing their selling procedure in response to bidder asymmetry, and using deal protection devices to cement their commitment to their selling procedure. Proof. See the Appendix.
As before (see Proposition 5), assuming that f is uniform allows us to analyze the equilibrium outcome in more detail. An increase in α benefits the shareholders, since the expected transaction price increases. However, this is not achieved by biasing the selling procedure more, since total value creation increases, too.
Instead, an increase in α strengthens competition between the bidders: the relevance of their signals for their valuation increases, and that makes both bidders better informed. Reducing the bias in the selling procedure is optimal: competition between the bidders is fiercer, so it is easier to extract value; and reduced bias generates more value which can then be extracted by the target.
This result has implications for empirical work: when estimating bid premia or announcement effects, it is important to control for the type of bidders that participated in the contest, since our model predicts a higher expected transaction price if bidders are trade buyers, and a lower expected transaction price if they are financial buyers.
Implications for Post-takeover Performance
A large number of studies have analyzed a target firm's post-takeover performance, testing (for example) whether target firms are more efficient after a change in control. The empirical evidence on long-term performance after takeovers seems inconclusive, cf. Andrade et al. (2001) , which suggests a need for more refined theoretical insights and empirical tests. Our results can shed new light on these issues.
One of our key insights is that the optimal procedure is biased and may lead to a distorted allocation: the target is sold to the bidder with the highest marginal revenue, not necessarily the bidder with the highest valuation. A bidder's valuation may be lower because less synergies can be realized, or because a bidder is less experienced at running the target. In other words, less value is created (on average) after a takeover, which should be reflected in a poorer post-takeover performance of the target, or at least below their true potential.
Our model predicts (cf. Proposition 5) that the wider the asymmetry between the bidders, the more biased the allocation rule, and the wider the gap between realized and potential productivity and profitability: the winner of the contest is less likely to be the bidder who can produce cash flows with the highest present value. So all else equal, we should expect a lower post-takeover performance if, say, one of the bidders was the management team, than if all bidders were symmetrically informed. Similarly, all else equal we should expect an opaque diversified conglomerate to perform less well than a focused one-division firm after a takeover. Similarly, our model predicts (cf. Proposition 6) that if α increases, value creation becomes more relevant in the target's tradeoff between value creation and value extraction.
In other words, the allocation rule is less biased the higher α is. Consequently, our model predicts that the target's post-takeover performance should be more clearly below its potential after a contest between financial buyers, compared with an otherwise identical contest between trade buyers. These predictions are relevant when interpreting a takeover target's pre-takeover and post-takeover performance. Some authors have argued that improved post-takeover performance is evidence of agency problems (inefficient management) that were resolved through the takeover.
13
Our results show that changes in the target's performance are also affected by bidder asymmetry, which produces a more biased selling procedure and therefore reduces the target's expected performance after a takeover. Similarly, it is necessary to control for bidder types when estimating how the target's performance changes, since it tends to be lower if bidders can be characterized as financial buyers.
Alternative Explanations
We have shown that in the presence of bidder asymmetry, it is optimal to structure a takeover contest as a sequential procedure, and that the seller must be able to credibly commit to the rules of the procedure she designed. In particular, she should not accept any new offers after a winner has been declared. Deal protection devices can help make the seller's commitment credible: poison pills that can be lifted by the board, lockups, termination fees, and similar devices can be used to make it impossible or unattractive for a rejected bidder to top the best outstanding offer, outside of the sequential procedure.
The popularity of deal protection devices in practice has attracted a lot of attention, 13 For an overview, see Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) .
from target shareholders, rejected bidders, the media, etc., and also from academics. In this section we discuss alternative explanations for the use of deal protection devices. This allows us to compare our model with other takeover models, and to compare the empirical implications of each, since we regard the use of deal protection devices as a good proxy for the degree of bias in a takeover contest.
Some authors argue that agency problems between managers and shareholders explain the use of takeover defenses: underperforming managers have strong incentives to entrench themselves, and to collude with their boards to protect them from disciplinary takeovers.
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In this case, the use of poison pills hurts the target shareholders, since their purpose is to prevent value-enhancing takeovers. Similarly, a captured board may grant termination fees, lockups, and other deal protection devices to a 'white knight', a bidder who promises not to replace management or impose discipline in other ways, in exchange for the acceptance of a low bid. Baron (1983) describes the tradeoff between increasing the expected transaction through resistance and the shareholder value losses if a target resists because it is run by inefficient managers.
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He suggests that managers with smaller ownership stakes will show greater resistance, all else equal. This argument is tested in many empirical studies which analyze bid premia, announcement effects, and a target's performance before and after a takeover.
The evidence seems to be mixed (see e.g. Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) ). Target resistance seems to reduce the likelihood and success rate of takeovers, but the offers that are made tend to include higher premia, which suggests that target shareholders benefit from some degree of resistance (see e.g. Comment and Schwert (1995) ). Stronger evidence is provided in Cotter et al. (1997) . They argue that targets with less entrenched managers (targets with more independent boards) resisted takeovers more strongly, but on average these targets enjoyed higher completion rates and higher final bid premia.
Together, these studies suggest that bid resistance is not driven mainly by managerial entrenchment. This supports our modeling choice of abstracting from agency problems between managers and shareholders, and focusing instead on the target board's possibilities to extract the highest possible transaction price from bidders in a realistic setting.
Nevertheless, agency problems may be relevant in some takeovers, and less so in others.
Some of our predictions can be distinguished from predictions that a model based on managerial entrenchment would produce. For example, consider a firm that is mature, operates in a mature industry, and has few investment opportunities and limited growth potential.
With a poor governance structure, this type of firm is likely to suffer from the "free cash flow problem" (Jensen (1986) ). Given our examples above, we would not call this an opaque firm, so there is likely not much asymmetry between bidders if the firm becomes a takeover target. Our model then predicts moderate or no use of deal protection devices, while a model based on agency considerations would predict heavy use to fend off hostile takeover offers.
However, if the firm is an opaque conglomerate, both models would predict heavy use of deal protection devices. This sheds new light on an unresolved issue, whether breaking up diversified conglomerates increases shareholder value: a high bid premium may be a consequence of bidder asymmetry, cf. Proposition 5, and not necessarily evidence of agency problems within conglomerates that are resolved through a takeover (even though managerial entrenchment may be highly correlated with opaqueness, our suggested proxy for bidder asymmetry).
Similarly, if agency problems were indeed the reason for the use of deal protection devices, we should find them most damaging in the case of MBOs, where the agency view would predict that managers are trying to expropriate shareholders in collusion with the board.
Thus, MBOs with deal protection devices should be associated with lower premia. On the other hand, if deal protection devices are used by target boards that try to maximize shareholder value, then we should observe higher bid premia. Also, in this case the board should agree to deal protection devices with any bidder, not just management. Finally, our model shows how the optimal selling procedure depends on the type of bidders, i.e. whether they are financial buyers or trade buyers. It is not clear what predictions a model based on agency considerations would make for different types of bidders. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) provide alternative rationales for the use of devices that favor or handicap one bidder. Their focus is on the firm's possibilities to extract a high transaction price if a raider identifies the firm as an attractive takeover target. The main characteristic of bidders in their models is that they find it costly to gather information and prepare bids. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) assume that a target can receive takeover bids only in a specific sequence, and they analyze how the target can use "greenmail" payments to signal to other potential bidders that it has not yet identified a "white knight." They find that paying greenmail to an early bidder who is less well informed than her rivals may encourage the remaining bidders to acquire costly information and compete for the target, raising the expected transaction price.
Similarly, in Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) the target can accept bids only in a specific order; in their model, the target can use "value-reducing defensive strategies" that reduce the valuation of one bidder by an amount that the target can choose, while leaving the valuation of other bidders unaffected. Given their assumption that bidders find it costly to acquire information about the target, the strategy of the first bidder is to submit a preemptive bid, i.e. a bid sufficiently high to deter the other potential bidders from acquiring any information and submitting a bid. By threatening the first bidder with a large enough value reduction, a target makes it easier for the later bidders to win the contest and earn a positive payoff, which forces the early bidder to submit a higher preemptive bid.
There are important differences between our paper and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) . On a formal level, our results are more general. We do not restrict the target to a limited set of actions, e.g. to one specific type of deal protection device.
Similarly, the target is not restricted to accepting bids in a specific order. Instead, the target is free to design the selling procedure that can extract the highest possible transaction price from the bidders. For example, we find that the target will initially attempt to strike a deal with the strong bidder, and only if that fails the weaker bidder is involved; this sequential structure is not imposed exogenously, but is instead optimal.
Our model predicts that the target may conclude an exclusive deal either with the strong or with the weak bidder, depending on the circumstances. This highlights the advantages of using our more general setting: with the more stringent constraints that are imposed on the seller in Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) , the identity of the excluded bidder is always the same: in Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , the (weaker) early bidder should be excluded from bidding using greenmail; in Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) , the value-reduction strategies should be applied to the strong bidder.
On a more general level, our paper differs from Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) because they focus on a different type of takeover situation. The models may therefore be regarded as complementary, not competing explanations for target behavior observed in practice. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) study a takeover market with raiders, who analyze random samples of firms hoping to find some that are run inefficiently, take them over, discipline management, and pocket the gains from increased efficiency. The shareholders of potential targets must ensure that a raider's expected profits are sufficiently high, but not too high, for example by allowing for certain types of deal protection device in the corporate charter. After that, the seller must wait for a raider to appear and make an offer for the target. In contrast, the seller in our model actively decides to put the target up for sale, and then proceeds to designing an optimal selling procedure.
There are some additional, technical differences between our paper and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) . First, their models are limited to a pure private values setup. As we argue above, this setup describes takeover situations in which each bidder hopes to realize individual synergies that are not available to other bidders. However, many takeover are better described by a model with common values, say if the bidders are financial buyers. Our model allows for both private and common value components, with varying degrees, and can thus capture more realistic situations. This is a valuable generalization, since different weights on the two components lead to different optimal selling procedures and to different expected transaction prices (cf. Proposition 6).
A second technical difference is that we abstract from the costs of information acquisition.
This does not appear to be a strong assumption. In a more general model with such costs, it would be plausible to assume that the costs are lower for certain bidders. For example, an MBO team should find it much easier to come up with a reasonable value estimate; similarly, a competitor should have lower costs of generating information of a given quality than a third party who has no experience in the target's industry. Consequently, since the bidders earn rents in our model, bidders with lower costs should in equilibrium obtain more reliable information than bidders with higher costs, and our results would remain qualitatively unchanged.
Conclusion
We have analyzed how a takeover contest should optimally be designed in the presence of bidders that are not equally well informed. We have derived the general properties of optimal selling procedures, and the details of a sequential procedure that is optimal. This sequential procedure encourages bidders to compete by treating them in an asymmetric fashion.
At first sight it might seem that the target should increase bidder competition by handicapping the better informed bidder, since a less well informed bidder is a weak competitor to the better informed bidder. However, the optimal selling procedure does more than that: it actively uses bidder asymmetry to better play off the bidders against each other, by offering exclusive deals to one bidder while ignoring any bids from another bidder. Specifically, the possibility of an exclusive deal encourages the better informed bidder to reveal a high willingness to pay (and then pay a high price), and the threat of an exclusive deal with the other bidder discourages the revelation of a low willingness to pay. Our model suggests that bidder asymmetry can actually increase the target's expected transaction price, contrary to the initial intuition. We also find that the type of bidders affects the optimal selling procedure and the outcome, i.e. whether bidders are better characterized as trade buyers or financial buyers. The existing empirical work on takeovers does not control for these effects which, as we show, may be quite important.
Our results also show why shareholder value maximizing target boards should in practice make frequent use of deal protection devices. The sequential selling procedure requires that the seller is committed to its rules, and these devices help the seller cement this commitment.
Evaluating the costs and benefits of deal protections devices then requires that they are evaluated within the context of an entire takeover contest: the use of deal protection devices should be upheld in court if a target's board can show that they were agreed upon as part of an optimally designed selling procedure. While target shareholders may benefit by opportunistically accepting late bids that are submitted after a winner has been declared, this possibility undermines the effectiveness of the sequential selling procedure, thereby harming the shareholders of future takeover targets. (s 1 , s 2 ) − v 1 ( s 1 , s 2 ) )p 1 ( s 1 , s 1 )f (s 1 )ds 1 (and similarly U 2 (s 2 , s 2 )) to obtain
We first show that if 
Substituting for V i ( s i ) from (A1) in (A2),
If s i > s i then since Q is weakly increasing, we can substitute for the lower bound on Q i (s i ) to obtain the following inequality:
The argument for s i ≤ s i is similar.
Now we show that the strategies (7)- (11) 
we have V 2 (s 2 ) = αϕ 2 F (z 1 (s 2 )) = αϕ 2 Q 2 (s 2 ). We have, thus, shown Q i (s i ) > 0 and increase the chances of winning above 1, while possibly leading to higher payments. Thus, the bidders will not deviate from the strategies (7)-(11).
Proof of Proposition 2
F (z 2 (s))ds
< E[t] + ϕ 1 α(z 1 (t) − E[t]).
If α is sufficiently small, this is smaller than 
Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemma 2, the function z 1 has a fixed point in σ, which does not depend on ϕ 1 or ϕ 2 since they are not arguments of Ψ, cf. (3). Elements of z 1 are characterized by ϕ 1 Ψ(s 1 ) = ϕ 2 Ψ(s 2 ).
Suppose ϕ 2 decreases by a small ε > 0. This affects the right-hand side of ϕ 1 Ψ(s 1 ) = ϕ 2 Ψ(s 2 ), which becomes less positive (if s 2 > σ) or less negative (if s 2 < σ). In order to remain on the z 1 curve, for a given s 2 we must select a signal s 1 such that ϕ 1 Ψ(s 1 ) = (ϕ 2 − ε)Ψ(s 2 ).
If s 2 = σ, no change to s 1 is needed. If s 2 < σ, then Ψ(s 2 ) < 0 and Ψ(z 1 (s 2 )) < 0, too, requiring an increase in s 1 . If s 2 > σ, then Ψ(s 2 ) > 0 and Ψ(z 1 (s 2 )) > 0, too, requiring a decrease in s 1 . The proof for increases in ϕ 1 is similar and therefore omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4
Fix any two α 0 and α 1 = α 0 . Suppose that for some s 2 ≥ E[t], we have z 1 (s 2 ) = z 1 for both α = α 0 and α = α 1 . This implies that 
